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Public Health Issues Posed by the Use of Porcine Xenografts

T a b l e   1

Bacterial Pathogens of Pigs Capable of Transmission to Humans Following Xenotransplantation
Actinobacillus
Actinomyces pyogenes
Brucella suis
Campylobacter coli
Campylobacter jejuni
Chlamydia psittaci
Clostridium perfringens
Clostridium septicum
Clostridium tetani
Corynebacterium suis
Enterobacteriaceae
Erysipelothrix rhusiopathiae
Haemophilius species
Leptospira interrogans
Listeria monocytogenes
Mycobacterium avium
Mycobacterium bovis
Mycobacterium tuberculosis
Mycobacterium fortuitum
Pasteurella multocida
Pseudomonas aeruginosa
Pseudomonas pseudomallei
Salmonella cholerasuis
Salmonella typhimurium
Shigella species
Staphylococcus aureus
Streptococcus species
Yersinia enterocolitica
Yersinia pseudotuberculosis


Source: Dominic C. Borie, et al, "Microbiological Hazards Related to Xenotransplantation of Porcine Organs Into Man," Infection Control and Hospital Epidemiology, Vol. 19, No. 5 (May 1998): 357.


T a b l e   2

Fungal, Parasitic, and Other Microbial Agents of Pigs Capable of Transmission to Humans Following Xenotransplantation
Fungi Parasites and Protozoa Others
Aspergillus species Ascaris suum Prions
Candida albicans Babesia species Unknown agents
Coccidioides immitis Balantidium coli  
Cryptococcus neoformans Capillaria hepatica  
Histoplasma capsulatum Clonorchis sinesis  
Microsporum nanum Cryptosporidium species  
Petriellidium boydii Echinococcus granulosa  
Prototheca Enlamoeba histolytica  
Sporothrix schenkii Entamoeba polecki  
Zygomyceles Fasciola hepatica  
Nocardia asteroides Isospora species  
  Paragonimus westermani  
  Pneumocystis carinii  
  Sarcocystis species  
  Schistosoma species  
  Strongyloidews ransomi  
  Taenia species  
  Toxoplasma gondii  
  Trypanosoma cruzi  
  Trichinella spiralis  

Source: Dominic C. Borie, et al, "Microbiological Hazards Related to Xenotransplantation of Porcine Organs Into Man," Infection Control and Hospital Epidemiology, Vol. 19, No. 5 (May 1998): 358.


T a b l e   3

Porcine Viruses Capable of Transmission to Humans Following Xenotransplantation
Porcine adenovirus
Porcine cytomegalovirus
Porcine rotavirus
Porcine endogenous and exogenous retroviruses
Aujeszky's disease virus
Japanese encephalitis virus
Encephalomyocarditis virus
Vesicular stomatitis virus
Swine vesicular disease virus
Foot-and-mouth disease virus
Rabies virus
Swine influenza virus
Swine parainfluenza-1 virus
[Malaysian "Nipah" virus]
[Australian Paramyxovirus]


Source: Dominic C. Borie, et al, "Microbiological Hazards Related to Xenotransplantation of Porcine Organs Into Man," Infection Control and Hospital Epidemiology, Vol. 19, No. 5 (May 1998): 359.

On April 6, 1999, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) issued guidelines on "Public Health Issues Posed by the Use of Nonhuman Primate Xenografts." The guidelines instituted a de facto ban on nonhuman primate xenografts because they would expose patients and the public to "significant infectious disease risk." But the FDA failed to address the dangers to public health posed by the use of organs, cells and tissue from pigs, touted as the source animals of choice for xenotransplants.

Xenotransplant researchers and biotechnology companies have implied that it would somehow be safer to use pigs rather than baboons as sources for organs, cells, and tissue in xenotransplants 1 because, they say, humans have co-existed with, and eaten, pigs for centuries with allegedly no ill effects.2 But these statements ignore several important facts.

Scientists acknowledge that "little or nothing is known about the pathogenic potential of endogenous retroviruses introduced directly into other species."3 The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services has publicly acknowledged that xenotransplantation poses inherent disease risks to patients and non-patients alike. (Non-patients include animal handlers, surgical team members who harvest and implant animal organs, lab workers handling clinical specimens from xenotransplant recipients, nurses4 and others who would provide medical care to the patient(s),5 relatives and friends of the patient, and the public at large.) The swine flu epidemic of 1918, which killed 20-40 million people worldwide, is a grim reminder of what happens when diseases jump the species barrier. Placing animal organs directly into humans circumvents all the natural barriers designed to prevent infection.6 CRT believes that using pigs as source animals for xenotransplants would not only be dangerous, but irresponsible.

Several documents have described the nature of porcine infectious diseases;7 and it is known that pigs can carry bacterial, fungal, protozoal, helminth and viral pathogens.8

All vertebrate species, including humans, harbor endogenous retroviruses, acquired during the course of evolution, some of which are capable of infecting other species. Pigs, like nonhuman primates, harbor endogenous retroviruses. It is estimated that hundreds of different endogenous retroviruses may be present in one animal.9

Viruses infecting pigs that cannot be guaranteed to be absent from a xenograft include porcine retrovirus, porcine polyomavirus, porcine parvovirus, porcine circovirus, porcine cytomegalovirus, porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome virus, influenza virus,10 porcine hepatitis E virus,11 and porcine herpesvirus.12

In pigs, the expression of retroviruses has been associated with the development of leukemia and lymphoma.13 In humans, retroviruses can induce chronic, life-long infections, "long latency malignancies, neurological disorders, wasting diseases and immunodeficiencies, for which treatment is limited or unavailable."14 Some retroviruses, such as simian foamy virus (SFV) and simian immunodeficiency virus (SIV), have spread to animal handlers with occupational exposures to baboons and rhesus monkeys, proving that transmission of retroviruses can occur under conditions that are less intimate than xenotransplantation.15

The potential for transmission of porcine retroviruses to xenograft recipients is a significant concern for xenotransplantation.

Pigs harbor type C endogenous retroviruses. Most cell lines derived from porcine tissues actively produce type C retroviruses.16 At least two infectious variants of porcine endogenous proviruses, dubbed PERV-A and PERV-B, are widely distributed in different organs, cells and tissues (spleen, heart, kidney, liver, lung, thymus) of different breeds of pigs. These retroviruses are passed from mother to offspring and therefore cannot be eliminated by the conventional techniques used to generate specific pathogen-free animals.17 Furthermore, specific-pathogen-free pigs may be silent carriers of enteric organisms such as micrococci, streptococci D, and colibacillus; and contamination by as-yet unrecognized pathogens will always be possible.18 Veterinarian M.M. Swindle asserts that "it will be impossible to provide complete individual animal screening in a timely fashion prior to performing a xenograft transplant."19

Recent studies have shown that:

  • porcine endogenous retroviruses (PERVs) can infect human cells in test tubes,20

  • PERVs' replication capacity was found to increase when passaged in human kidney cells,21 and

  • journal articles have suggested possible transmission of porcine viruses, such as pseudorabies, to human recipients of porcine islet cells.22

There is also evidence of human contamination and/or infection by:

  • porcine rhabdoviruses (i.e. vesicular stomatitis virus),

  • picornaviruses (i.e. foot-and-mouth disease, swine vesicular disease virus),

  • swine influenza,23

  • paramyxovirus,24

  • and the novel "Nipah" viral encephalitis virus that recently infected over 250 people, induced relapses in several patients,25 killed 117, and led to the mass slaughter of some one million pigs and thousands of dogs, goats and sheep in Malaysia.26

Borie, et al., write that, in the context of xenotransplantation:

  • Bacteria could theoretically be transmitted to humans in the event of bacteremia, occurring during organ harvesting. Current procedures of organ preservation before grafting would not necessarily circumvent the risk because bacterial growth at temperatures close to 0O C has been documented for bacteria like Yersinia. Detection of bacteria with current assays may prove difficult.

  • In humans, liver abcesses caused by Entamoeba histolytica, and gastrointestnal infection by Entamoeba polecki, commonly found in pigs, have been documented. Pig organs may be infested with parasites. Such parasites may not currently be recognized as zoonoses and might become established in immunosuppressed patients.

  • Numerous fungal infections, in humans and pigs, are latent in healthy individuals, but may become activated after host defenses are weakened by immunosuppression.

  • Pigs carry a broad spectrum of potentially zoonotic viruses. These cause a wide range of symptoms in humans, including fever and general malaise, sores on the face or feet, neurological disorders, meningitis, and death. Pigs may also act as "mixing vessels" for viruses from other mammals and birds.27

Pigs also carry prion proteins (associated with "mad cow disease") that could be transmitted to humans, and are likely to carry numerous viruses and infectious organisms that have yet to be identified.

Therefore, all recipients of porcine cells, tissue, or organs would be exposed to PERVs and possibly other infectious organisms.

Finally, the genetic modification, or "humanization,"of pigs could provide an opportunity for animal viruses to fool the human immune system and "hide" inside the human body. German virologist Joachim Denner and others point out that retroviral infections from pigs may recombine with human endogenous retroviruses, leading to recombinant "superviruses" with unknown, and possibly more virulent properties. These could become preadapted for human infection and subsequent human-to-human transmission.28 Some recombinant retroviruses have been shown to induce cancer.29 Accurate screening for such viruses may be difficult.

In this vein, some scientists are concerned that xenotransplants could alter the human gene pool, by favoring the evolution of porcine-human chimeras (beings containing the genes of both pigs and humans)30 — a profoundly disturbing issue that has received little attention.31

It is inconceivable that the FDA would continue to approve clinical experiments with porcine organs, cells and tissue32 in light of the above facts. CRT believes that, if the FDA's mission is truly to "protect the public health," it would ban xenotransplantation outright.

Adapted from CRT's Comments to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration on "Public Health Issues Posed by the Use of Nonhuman Primate Xenografts," submitted July 2, 1999.



1 J. Fung, et al., "Clinical trials and projected future of liver xenotransplantation," World J. Surg, Vol. 21, No. 9 (Nov.-Dec. 1997): 956-61.

2 A. S. Daar, "Animal-to-human organ transplants - a solution or a new problem?," Bulletin of the World Health Organization, Vol.77, No. 1 (1999): 57.

3 Jonathan P. Stoye, et al., "Endogenous Retroviruses: A Potential Problem for Xenotransplantation," Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, Vol. 862 (1998): 68.

4 Several studies have suggested that nurses may not be willing to care for xenograft patients for fear of becoming infected with a zoonotic virus. See Suzanne D. Fullbrook, M.B. Wilkinson, "Animal to Human Transplants: The Ethics of Xenotransplantation (2)," British Journal of Theatre Nursing, Vol. 6, No. 3 (June 1996): 13-18; Paula J. Mohacsi, et al., "Aversion to Xenotransplantation," Nature, Vol. 378 (30 November 1995): 434.

5 Dominic C. Borie, et al., "Microbiological Hazards Related to Xenotransplantation of Porcine Organs in Man," Infection Control and Hospital Epidemiology, Vol. 19, No. 5 (May 1998):

6 Jon Allan, "Silk Purse or Sow's Ear," Nature Medicine, Vol. 3, No. 3 (March 1997): 275.

7 See M.B. Pensaert, Virus Infections of Porcines, (Elsevier Science Publishers, Amsterdam, 1989); P.N. Acha, Zoonoses and Communicable Diseases Common to Man and Animals, 2nd Ed. (Office Intl des Epizooties, Paris, 1987); B. Lautner, R.M. Friendship, "Human health in swine veterinary practice," Compendium on Continuing Education for the Practicing Veterinarian, Vol. 14 (1992): 99-101.

8 D.K.C. Cooper, et al., in Xenotransplantation - The Transplantation of Organs and Tissues Between Species, Cooper, Kemp, Reemtsma & White, eds., (Springer-Verlag, 1991), pp.481-500.

9 Dominic C. Borie, et al., (1998): 361.

10 Animal Tissues Into Humans - A Report by the Advisory Group on the Ethics of Xenotransplantation, (Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1997): 210.

11 X.J. Meng, "A Novel Virus in Swine is Closely Related to the Human Hepatitis E Virus," Proc Natl Acad Sci, Vol. 94, No. 18 (September 1997): 9860-5.

12 B. Ehlers, et al., "Detection of two novel porcine herpesviruses with high similarity to gammaherpesviruses," J Gen Virol, Vol. 80, Pt. 4 (April 1999): 971-8.

13 Douglas M. Smith, "Endogenous Retroviruses in Xenografts," The New England Journal of Medicine, (January 14, 1993): 142.

14 Jennifer Brown, et al., "Xenotransplantation and the risk of retroviral zoonosis," Trends in Microbiology, Vol. 6, No. 10 (October 1998): 411-12.

15 Ibid, 412.

16 C. Patience, et al., "Infection of human cells by an endogenous retrovirus of pigs," Nature Medicine, Vol. 3 (1997): 282-6; Douglas M. Smith, "Endogenous Retroviruses in Xenografts," The New England Journal of Medicine, (January 14, 1993): 142.

17 Jonathan P. Stoye, et al., "Endogenous Retroviruses: A Potential Problem for Xenotransplantation?," Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, Vol. 862 (1998): 68.

18 Dominic C. Borie, et al., (1998): 363.

19 M.M. Swindle, "Defining appropriate health status and management programs for specific-pathogen-free swine for xenotransplantation," Ann NY Acad Sci, Vol. 862 (December 1998): 111-20.

20 Clive Patience, et al., "Infection of human cells by an endogenous retrovirus of pigs," Nature Medicine, Vol. 3, No. 3 (March 1997): 282-6; Ulrich Martin, et al., "Expression of pig endogenous retrovirus by primary porcine endothelial cells and infection of human cells," The Lancet, Vol. 352, (August 29, 1998): 692-8; C. A. Wilson, et al., "Type C Retrovirus released from porcine primary peripheral blood mononuclear cells infects human cells," Journal of Virology, Vol. 72, No. 4 (April 1998): 3082-7; Y. Takeuchi, et al., "Host range and interference studies of three classes of pig endogenous retrovirus," Journal of Virology, Vol. 72, No. 12 (December 1998): 9986-91.

21 Joachim Denner, "Immunosuppression by Retroviruses: Implications for Xenotransplantation," Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, Vol. 862 (1998): 75-86.

22 Dominic C. Borie, et al., "Microbiological Hazards Related to Xenotransplantation of Porcine Organs into Man," Infection Control and Hospital Epidemiology, Vol. 19, No. 5 (May 1998): 356, 359.

23 Dominic C. Borie, et al., "Microbiological Hazards Related to Xenotransplantation of Porcine Organs into Man," Infection Control and Hospital Epidemiology, Vol. 19, No. 5 (May 1998): 355-65.

24 Robert Uhlig, "Transplant Virus Fears," The Electronic Telegraph, UK, February 26, 1998.

25 New Straits Times, June 30, 1999, source: http://www.healthnet.org/programs/promed.html

26 Source: http://www.oie.int/info/AIS_71.htm, June 5, 1999; Anon, "Malaysia Pig Virus, Said to Kill 117," May 7, 1999, Source: http://www.msnbc.com/news/257444.asp; Alvin Ung, "Tropical killer virus is first of its kind; experts stumped," Associated Press, April 8, 1999; WHO Regional Office for the Western Pacific, April 21/99. Pigs were buried alive.

27 Dominic C. Borie, et al. (1998): 356-62.

28 Joachim Denner, "Immunosuppression by Retroviruses: Implications for Xenotransplantation," Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, Vol. 862 (1998): 84; Robin A. Weiss, "Transgenic pigs and virus adaptation," Nature, Vol. 391 (22 January 1998): 327-8. See also Jennifer Brown, et al., (October 1998): 414.

29 Dominic C. Borie, et al., (1998): 362.

30 T.E. Starzl, et al., "Chimerism and Xenotransplantation. New Concepts," Surg Clin North Am, Vol. 79, No. 1 (February 1999): 191-205.

31 Jonathan S. Allan, "Nonhuman primates as organ donors?," Bulletin of the World Health Organization, Vol.77, No. 1 (1999): 63.

32 "FDA presently is overseeing a number of experimental clinical investigations that use xenograft products. Ongoing clinical trials include the use of fetal porcine neural cells to treat intractable epilepsy . . ., refractory Parkinson's disease, and Huntington's disease; various animal tissues as skin grafts for burn victims; baboon bone marrow to alleviate the effects of AIDS; bovine adrenal cells to relieve intractable chronic pain; encapsulated porcine islet cells to treat diabetes mellitus; xenogeneic hepatocyte cells as extracorporeal liver-assist devices; and porcine livers as a temporary bridge to human organ transplantation." Jack M. Kress, "Xenotransplantation: Ethics and Economics," Food and Drug Law Journal, Vol. 53, No.2 (1998): 366; Anon, "First Use of Bioartificial Liver in Chicago Region . . .," www.prnewswire.com, January 26, 1999.